Capturing Excess in the On-Demand Economy by Aloni, Erez
The Peter A. Allard School of Law
Allard Research Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Publications
2017
Capturing Excess in the On-Demand Economy
Erez Aloni
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, aloni@allard.ubc.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs
Part of the Law and Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Allard Research Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard Research Commons.
Citation Details
Erez Aloni, "Capturing Excess in the On-Demand Economy" (2017) 39 U Haw L Rev 315-356.
 Capturing Excess in the 
On-Demand Economy 
Erez Aloni*
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 315 
I.	 THE SPECTRUM OF WORK IN INCREASED UTILIZATION ............. 320 
II. THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF WORK IN EXCESS
CAPACITY ................................................................................................. 327 
A.	 Increased Utilization as a Choice-Enhancing Mechanism .................. 327 
B.	 Other Negative Externalities ................................................................ 338 
III. PRINCIPLES OF REGULATORY APPROACH ...................................... 343
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 354	
INTRODUCTION 
Jeannie Ralston, an author and journalist, owned an apartment southwest 
of Austin, Texas, which she used to lease as a long-term rental, for $650 a 
month.1  “Jump[ing] on the Airbnb gravy train,” as she describes it in a New 
York Times column, she and her husband decided to take the apartment off 
the long-term rental market and turn it into a short-term rental.2  Their 
calculation was that it would take only six nights of renting through Airbnb 
for them to make the equivalent of a month’s rent under their long-term 
lease.3  Ryan Scott took it one step further:  he owns twelve properties and 
manages ten more in San Diego, California—all used for short-term rentals 
via Airbnb.4  The reporter says that Ryan, in an interview, confessed that 
* Assistant Professor, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia.  I
would like to thank Melissa J. Durkee for helpful conversations about this article.  I am also 
indebted to Sara Gold for her excellent research assistance.  And I am grateful to the 
members of the University of Hawaiʻi Law Review for the productive symposium that 
generated this piece as well as for their exceptional editorial work.   
 1 See Jeannie Ralston, How to Survive Being an Airbnb Host, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/travel/airbnb-host.html. 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
4 See Lori Weisberg, Airbnb:  Opportunity or Nuisance?, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE 
(June 10, 2016, 12:00 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/tourism/sdut-
airbnb-opportunity-or-nuisance-2016jun10-story.html. 
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“he has become addicted to the intoxicating short-term rental revenues 
[that] his properties have been generating over the last few years.”5 
Michael Naess, who lives in a two-bedroom apartment in Queens, New 
York, rented one of his bedrooms to seventy-two guests in ten months—
using Airbnb.6  The guests stay in the extra bedroom in his apartment.7 
Finally, Jordan Reeves occasionally rents out his Brooklyn apartment while 
he is away.8 
What is common to all of these cases?  They all involve properties rented 
for short-term stays (under thirty days) via Airbnb.  But that is where the 
similarities end.  Each one of the lessors uses Airbnb for a different type of 
short-term rental.  Jeannie Ralston’s operation is akin to a bed and 
breakfast.9  Ryan Scott uses apartments for investment; he finds some that 
were rented long term, takes them off the residency market, and converts 
them to vacation rentals.10  Michael Naess rents his unoccupied room to 
make some extra money on a permanent basis.11  And Jordan Reeves 
subleases on a temporary basis when his apartment is empty because he is 
away.12 
One key distinguishing factor between these activities, I argue, is the 
level (or lack) of utilization of excess capacity. Increased utilization of 
excess capacity means leveraging the “‘surplus  value’ of  these  unused  or 
under-utilized assets” to create “more capacity than the owner can herself 
use at once and that can thereby be monetized.”13  Some types of use that 
on-demand platforms facilitate leverage this “idle capacity,” making sure 
that goods and skills that can be monetized are not wasted.14 Conversely, 
other usage is akin to conventional commercial use—not significantly 
different from the supply that incumbents provide. By “on-demand 
5 See id. 
 6 See N. R. Kleinfield, Airbnb Host Welcomes Travelers from All Over, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 25, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/27/nyregion/airbnb-host-welcomes-
travelers-from-all-over.html. 
7 See id. 
8 See Deepti Hajela, Some New York City Hosts are Confused About New Airbnb 
Advertising Law, SKIFT (Oct. 30, 2016, 7:00 PM), https://skift.com/2016/10/30/some-new-
york-city-hosts-are-still-confused-about-new-airbnb-advertising-law/. 
9 See Ralston, supra note 1. 
10 See Weisberg, supra note 4. 
11 See Kleinfield, supra note 6. 
12 See Hajela, supra note 8. 
13 See Donald J. Kochan, I Share, Therefore It’s Mine, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 
May 2017) (manuscript at 25) (on file with SSRN), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2820456. 
 14 See Orly Lobel, The Law of Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 108 (2016) (“A key 
principle of the platform is putting idle capacity to work.”). 
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economy” (often referred to by the misnomer “the sharing economy”),15 I 
mean an economic model where people—for profit—exchange goods, 
services, spaces, and money with each other via peer-to-peer platforms.16   
I hence consider activities that the on-demand platforms facilitate on a 
spectrum:  one end consists of activities in increased utilization of excess 
capacity, and the other end is composed of traditional commercial work 
without utilization of idle capacity.  I will call activities on the former end 
“casual work,” “work in increased excess capacity,” or work “in increased 
utilization.” I will call activities on the latter end—i.e., those not grounded 
primarily in utilization of excess capacity—“conventional work,” 
“commercial work,” or “excess in disguise.” 
Accordingly, we can rank all of the above examples on a spectrum based 
on their level of use—or lack thereof—of increased excess capacity.  Scott, 
who rents twenty-two units, creates new capacity (infrastructure) when he 
buys properties intended exclusively for short-term rentals.17 Ralston, who 
converted one unit from long-term to short-term rental, uses existing 
capacity by changing the purpose of the infrastructure she already has.18  
Conversely, Reeves and Naess capitalize on their otherwise underutilized 
goods to produce more income.19 But these two are different, too; the 
former rents occasionally, while the latter has turned an empty room into a 
permanent vacation unit. 
Yet, despite the differences in use of these properties, and the different 
economic and societal consequences of each of these uses, the law in many 
jurisdictions still treats three of these cases as the same activity:  with the 
exception of Naess,20 all these uses are illegal in most jurisdictions in the 
United States and in other Western democracies abroad.21 
                                                                                                             
 15  “‘[S]haring’ and [other] kindred designations are misnomers. Even if there are some 
altruistic or communal motives among those in the P2P economy, the heart of the industry is 
financial gain and not altruistic exchanges.”  Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the Sharing Economy, 
91 WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1407 (2016).  Thus, in this Article, to avoid this misnomer I use the 
term “on-demand economy.” 
 16 Id. at 1410 (defining the peer-to-peer economy as “an economic model where people 
exchange goods, services, space, and money with each other via peer-to-peer platforms”). 
 17 See Weisberg, supra note 4. 
 18 See Ralston, supra note 1. 
 19 See Hajela, supra note 8; Kleinfield, supra note 6. 
 20 Naess’s rental is lawful in presumably all jurisdictions because he is in the property 
during the lessee’s (“guest’s”) entire stay.   
 21 See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 4-6-300(h)(8), 4-14-060(d) (prohibiting short-term 
rental unless unit is homeowner’s “primary residence”); HONOLULU, HAW., LAND USE 
ORDINANCE § 21-10.1 (2016) (prohibiting short-term rentals for periods of less than thirty 
days); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4(8)(a) (prohibiting short-term rental unless permanent 
resident occupies unit concurrently with visitor); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 27, § 287.1 
(banning advertising of short-term rentals that violate the NEW YORK MULTIPLE DWELLING 
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In this Article, I submit that activities facilitated by the on-demand 
platforms produce a different level of negative and positive externalities, 
based on their location along the spectrum of increased utilization.  
Transactions in increased excess capacity produce the fewest negative 
externalities and produce more positive externalities; the more we move 
along the spectrum toward no use of excess capacity, the more negative 
externalities the activity produces.  As such, a unique set of rules—tailored 
to address the particular benefits and harms that stem from each activity—
should govern each category. 
This distinction between work in increased excess capacity and other 
conventional uses in disguise is also prevalent in other sectors of the “on-
demand economy.”  For example, in the transportation arena some drivers 
for Uber work part-time, leveraging their increased excess capacity in terms 
of labor.22  Similarly, some drivers use their private, not-for-business 
vehicle, thus monetizing the time during which their car otherwise would 
not be serving an economically useful end.23  Others, conversely, work full 
time as drivers, using vehicles with the primary purpose of transporting 
passengers.24 The point is that the on-demand economy, although it often 
promotes the exchange of activities based on increased excess capacity, is 
also used simply as an alternative business method to commercial offerings 
that do not utilize idle capacity. 
The distinction between the level of increased utilization—or the lack of 
such increase—is crucial to understanding and evaluating the social and 
economic costs that the on-demand economy produces.  First, activities in 
increased excess capacity expand valuable choice, both for consumers and 
                                                                                                             
LAW); Zweckentfremdungsverbot-Gesetz [ZwVbG] [Act on the Prohibition of Illegal 
Repurposing of Housing], Nov. 29, 2013; GESETZ-UND VERORDNUNGSBLATT FÜR BERLIN 
[BLN GVBl.] at 626, § 2(1) (Ger.) (defining “illegal repurposing of housing” to include the 
use of an entire home as a vacation rental).  See generally Michele Finck & Sofia 
Ranchordás, Sharing and the City, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1299 (2016) (conducting 
comparative analysis of P2P economy regulation in the U.S. and Europe). 
 22 See Aloni, supra note 15, at 1435 (citing STEVEN HILL, RAW DEAL:  HOW THE “UBER 
ECONOMY” AND RUNAWAY CAPITALISM ARE SCREWING AMERICAN WORKERS 122 (2015)); 
Jacob Davidson, Uber Reveals How Much Its Drivers Really Earn . . . Sort of, TIME (Jan. 22, 
2015), http://time.com/money/3678389/uber-drivers-wages/; see also AMY LEVIN, 
BENENSON STRATEGY GRP., THE DRIVER ROADMAP:  WHERE UBER DRIVER-PARTNERS HAVE 
BEEN, AND WHERE THEY’RE GOING 3 (2014), https://newsroom.uber.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/BSG_Uber_Report.pdf  (noting, in study commissioned by Uber, 
that just over half of Uber drivers drove on a part-time basis). 
 23 See Aloni, supra note 15, at 1435. 
 24 See id.; LEVIN, supra note 22, at 5 (finding, in study commissioned by Uber, that 55% 
of UberBLACK drivers, representing 18% of total Uber drivers, drive more than 30 hours 
per week); see also infra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. 
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for providers.25  For example, the amplified opportunities for travelers to 
stay in a local resident’s apartment allow those visitors to experience the 
destination from that resident’s perspective.26  Likewise, for workers using 
increased excess capacity, the on-demand economy offers the option to 
work part time in a flexible setting.27  Conversely, while traditional 
activities created by on-demand platforms can extend choice, they can also 
result in reduction of valuable choice by eliminating the availability of 
traditional services and jobs.28  For instance, the accessibility of traditional 
lower-end hotels may be endangered by unfair competition from those who 
offer their units for rent full-time but do not have to abide by the regulation 
of such facilities (and can offer their units for a lower price).29  
Correspondingly, people’s opportunities to find a full-time job, with all the 
benefits and protections that accompany it, get scarcer when similar work is 
offered by providers who do not get similar protections—and thus proffer 
the same job at a cheaper price.30 
Second, transactions in increased utilization produce fewer negative 
externalities than on-demand activities that do not leverage excess capacity.  
For instance, temporarily renting one’s property via Home Away or Airbnb 
creates some negative externalities.  As examples:  unfamiliar people in the 
common area, nuisances, and pressures on shared utilities such as parking.31  
But activity that does not utilize excess capacity, such as renting a property 
the entire year on a short-term basis, is likely to intensify the negative 
externalities.32  It can result in housing shortages, housing price increases, 
                                                                                                             
 25 See Aloni, supra note 15, at 1413–16, 1434–35. 
 26 Roberta A. Kaplan & Michael L. Nadler, Airbnb:  A Case Study in Occupancy 
Regulation and Taxation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 103, 105 (2015) (“One of the 
primary benefits that it provides is that it allows guests to ʻlive like a local’ and explore 
neighborhoods that do not typically cater to tourists, both by providing accommodations in a 
wide variety of locales and by connecting visitors with local residents.”). 
 27 Aloni, supra note 15, at 1435 (citing HILL, supra note 22, at 122; Davidson, supra 
note 22). 
 28 See id. at 1437 (citing Lauren Weber, One in Three U.S. Workers Is a Freelancer, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/atwork/2014/09/04/one-in-three-u-s-
workers-is-a-freelancer/). 
 29 See id. at 1417 (citing Georgios Zervas, Davide Prosperio & John Byers, The Rise of 
the Sharing Economy:  Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry, 30 (Boston U. 
Sch. Mgmt. Research, Working Paper No. 2013-16), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2366898). 
 30 See infra notes 137–145 and accompanying text. 
 31 See Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 147, 192–93 (2016) (discussing “Good Neighbor Regulations” aimed at 
alleviating noise, parking, and trash concerns). 
 32 See infra notes 153–172 and accompanying text. 
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decline in revenue from hotel taxes, and collapse of some hotels, to name a 
few of the negative externalities. 
The challenge for regulation of the on-demand economy, I contend, is in 
crafting rules that will capture this distinction.  Regulation that treats the 
two categories differently will impose more rigorous (classic) rules of 
compliance when one does not leverage excess capacity, and an easy-to-
administer regime, with light regulation, for activity in underutilized goods 
or time, that recognizes the particular value and nature of these activities.  
In this Article, I offer basic principles for how to capture (by regulation) 
which activities operate in increased utilization of excess capacity and what 
the basic principles of such regulations should be. 
The Article proceeds in the following way:  Part I demonstrates that the 
distinction between work in increased idle capacity and traditional work is 
significant in terms of presentation in the on-demand economy and cuts 
across different industries of the on-demand economy.  Part II contends that 
the two activities have different societal and economic impacts:  increased 
utilization produces more choice and fewer negative externalities, while 
traditional work can result in loss of valuable options and produce more 
negative externalities.  Part III lays out the basic principles of regulation for 
the on-demand economy, based on this distinction, and evaluates laws that 
have embraced these principles. 
I. THE SPECTRUM OF WORK IN INCREASED UTILIZATION 
The growth of the on-demand economy has raised significant regulatory 
dilemmas for lawmakers around the world.33  On one side, some 
consumers, scholars, and lobbyists, rooting for the on-demand firms, have 
asked lawmakers to limit their intervention and let the innovation flourish.34  
On the other side, incumbents, labor rights advocates, and communities 
affected by on-demand activities request lawmakers to constrain some of 
the harms inflicted by the rise of this model.35 
                                                                                                             
 33 See Aloni, supra note 15, at 1400. 
 34 See, e.g., Arun Sundararajan, Why the Government Doesn’t Need to Regulate the 
Sharing Economy, WIRED (Oct. 22, 2012, 1:45 PM), https://www.wired.com/2012/10/from-
airbnb-to-coursera-why-the-government-shouldnt-regulate-the-sharing-economy/ (“By 
making both product and trader quality instantly transparent, [the self-regulatory transaction 
feedback] approach reduces the risks that often lead to market failure [and] provides a first 
digital safeguard against much of what regulators aim to protect consumers from. After all, 
profit is a much more powerful driver for quality than regulatory compliance.”).  
 35 See Aloni, supra note 15, at 1427–29 (describing the different approaches for 
regulation of the on-demand economy); Frank Pasquale, Two Narratives of Platform 
Capitalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 309, 316 (2016) (analyzing the competing narratives 
towards the on-demand economy). 
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Within this debate, the role that work in increased excess capacity 
occupies in the on-demand economy takes on a special significance.  
Scholars, commentators, and the on-demand firms themselves often base 
many of their arguments against regulatory requirements on the premise 
that the model is characterized primarily by transactions in increased excess 
capacity.36  For example, in response to a court ruling37 that found a New 
York City short-term rental, facilitated by Airbnb, illegal, Airbnb proffered:  
It is time to fix this law and protect hosts who occasionally rent out their own 
homes.  Eighty-seven percent of Airbnb hosts in New York list just a home 
they live in—they are average New Yorkers trying to make ends meet, not 
illegal hotels that should be subject to the 2010 law.38  
And Uber stated, in court filings concerning the classification of its 
workers, that the firm “merely provides a platform for people who own 
vehicles to leverage their skills and personal assets and connect with other 
people looking to pay for those skills and assets.”39 
The claim that most suppliers in the on-demand economy use their 
increased excess capacity is critical to the argument in support of the on-
demand economy because it distinguishes the on-demand market from the 
traditional market.  Thus, it should free the on-demand firms from 
regulations that are tailored for conventional industries.  If workers are only 
maximizing their assets and time, the argument goes, they are different 
from incumbents who work with designated capital and as full-time 
                                                                                                             
 36 See, e.g., Andrew T. Bond, An App for That:  Local Governments and the Rise of the 
Sharing Economy, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 77, 78 (2015) (“The sharing economy is 
a microeconomic system built around the utilization of unused human and physical 
resources.”); Timothy Doescher, How Congress Can Clear the Road for Uber, Lyft, and the 
Gig Economy, THE DAILY SIGNAL (Oct. 27, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/ 
2016/10/27/how-congress-can-clear-the-road-for-uber-lyft-and-the-gig-economy/ (arguing 
that the benefit of the gig economy is grounded in flexibility and that “[o]ne fact . . . may 
explain this: over half of the drivers surveyed are part-time drivers working other jobs.”); 
Hugo Martin, Big Chunk of Airbnb’s Revenue Comes from Year-Round Rentals, Study 
Finds, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016, 11:16 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-airbnb-
hotels-20160120-story.html (Responding to a report commissioned by the American Hotel 
and Lodging Association, which found that multi-unit operators are responsible for a third of 
Airbnb’s revenue, the company stated, “This report uses misleading data to make false 
claims and attack middle class families who share their homes and use the money they earn 
to pay the bills.”). 
 37 See City of New York v. Carrey, Nos. 13006002 and 1300736 (N.Y.C. Envtl. Control 
Bd. May 9, 2013), https://www.scribd.com/document/142650911/Decision-and-Order-for-
NOV-35006622J. 
 38 See Vacation Rental Site Airbnb Ruled Illegal in New York City, FOX NEWS (May 21, 
2013), http://www.foxnews.com/travel/2013/05/21/airbnb-illegal-in-new-york-city.html. 
 39 Salovitz v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. A-14-CV-823-LY, 2014 WL 5318031, at *1 (W.D. 
Tex. Oct. 16, 2014). 
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employees.  Put differently, the work of the on-demand market is not one 
that replaces or competes with the work of incumbents; rather, it is a new 
market, occupied by microearners.40  The result is a model that increases 
options for consumers and workers, giving them the opportunity to work in 
small gigs to make some supplemental income.  It is, essentially, a “gig 
economy”: a small-scale economy of people who monetize their 
underutilized time, skills, and goods.41  Conversely, if this market is 
populated by incumbent-like transactions, then it calls for regulation more 
akin to the traditional paradigm.  Hence, proving that the on-demand 
economy truly is a small-scale, gig economy that creates new markets and 
extended options is essential to the argument that the on-demand economy 
should not be governed by traditional regulation. 
Much of the data regarding the on-demand economy are debatable, and 
some of them are funded or provided directly by interested parties.42  Yet, 
despite this limitation, the data show a clear picture:  an immense portion of 
the on-demand economy is comprised of work done that is—i.e., work that 
is based on utilization of idle capacity.43  Simultaneously, a large segment 
of that economy is not based on increased utilization but is comprised of 
full-time workers sometimes using designated capital:  goods that are used 
primarily for this purpose.44  This fragment of the on-demand economy is 
                                                                                                             
 40 Cf. Lobel, supra note 14, at 93 (“[P]art  of  the  value  produced  by  the  platform  lies  
in  its  differentiation  from  traditional,  offline exchanges.  In other words, it reveals how 
the platform economy is  not  simply  competing  efficiently  over  the  same  markets  of  
regulated industries but also constituting new markets, norms, and behaviors.”). 
 41 See Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government Law:  
The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L. J. 901, 925 (2015) 
(“[T]he  rise  of  sharing  firms  as  replacements  for  traditional, full-time jobs leads some 
to lament the rising ‘gig economy’ as a wealth  transfer  from  workers  to  capital,  shifting  
risk  from  employers  to  workers. Sharing firms resist this claim, arguing their employees 
. . .  are given supplementary income that would otherwise be unavailable.”). 
 42 See, e.g., LEVIN, supra note 22 (touting benefits of driving for Uber based on driver 
surveys in study funded by Uber); JOHN W. O’NEILL & YUXIA OUYANG, AM. HOTEL & 
LODGING ASS’N, FROM AIR MATTRESSES TO UNREGULATED BUSINESS:  AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
OTHER SIDE OF AIRBNB (2016), https://www.ahla.com/sites/default/files/2016-10/ 
Airbnb_Analysis_September_2016.pdf (criticizing Airbnb in study funded by the American 
Hotel and Lodging Association). 
 43 See LEVIN, supra note 22, at 5 (finding that Uber was rarely a sole source of income); 
O’NEILL & OUYANG, supra note 42, at 5, 7–8 (finding that only “26% of Airbnb’s revenue is 
derived from . . . full-time hosts” and comparing full-time hosts to all hosts using Airbnb’s 
platform). 
 44 See LEVIN, supra note 22, at 5 (“62% of people who lease/finance their car use Uber 
to help with car payments”); O’NEILL & OUYANG, supra note 42, at 5, 7–8 (finding that “[a] 
growing number of hosts are using the Airbnb platform to operate full-time businesses” and 
noting that full-time operators “represented only 3.5% of operators, but generated 26.0% of 
revenue”). 
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not only large in terms of number of participants and transactions but also 
yields a vast part of the revenue of the on-demand firms.45  And despite 
rhetoric that emphasizes the excess-capacity aspect, work without excess 
utilization is sometimes even encouraged by the on-demand firms 
themselves.46 
I will begin with the data about the short-term on-demand rental market.  
To distinguish between lessors who use their underutilized assets and those 
who use designated capital, I delve into data about the number of lessors 
who have more than one unit posted on on-demand platforms or whose unit 
is available for an entire year for short-term rental.  The principle is that 
posting a unit as available for a period of more than a few months for short-
term rentals indicates that it is for commercial use, rather than for incidental 
use in capitalizing idle capacity. 
A study, run by the Penn State University School of Hospitality 
Management and funded by the American Hotel and Lodging Association, 
examined the lessors who posted properties on Airbnb in fourteen big 
United States metropolitan areas, from October 2014 to September 2015.47  
The study divided “hosts” (lessors) into three categories:  those who offered 
an entire unit for a short time during the year, those who offered a unit for 
the entire year, and those who had two or more units on the platform.48  The 
results demonstrate that those who work with designated capital, although 
the minority, are consistently present across all of the cities and are 
responsible for massive revenues for Airbnb.  The study found that 2,772 
full-time operators (those who made their unit or units available more than 
360 days a year) constitute 3.5% of the total lessors.49  While this may seem 
like a small number, the revenue that Airbnb derived from these full-time 
operators was enormous.  In the period studied, they yielded $347,479,616 
for Airbnb, which constitutes 26% of Airbnb’s total revenue in those 
locations during that period.50  Further, the study found that lessors who 
rented two or more units for any amount of time constituted 16.2% of all 
operators.51  Finally, mega-operators—defined by the study as hosts who 
rent more than three units (for any amount of time)—constituted 6.5% of 
the hosts and yielded 24.6% of Airbnb’s revenue, or $328,299,944, in those 
cities during that period.52 
                                                                                                             
 45 See notes 47–49 and accompanying text. 
 46 See notes 221–223 and accompanying text. 
 47 O’NEILL & OUYANG, supra note 42. 
 48 Id. at 4. 
 49 Id. at 7. 
 50 Id.  
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 6. 
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Further, looking at data from a few specific cities (not included in the 
above study) provides a more nuanced picture that confirms the same 
conclusions.53  For example, in Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, in March 2017, there 
were 1,519 active hosts.54  Of these, 1,000 had one unit, 238 had two, 88 
had three, 57 had four, and 117 had five or more.55  Again, most lessors had 
one unit; but around one third were multi-unit operators of different 
degrees.56  Further, of the 3,358 rentals available in 2016, 33% were 
available for ten to twelve months; 20.8%, for seven to nine months; and 
only 17.4%, for one to three months.57  Thus, this smaller-scale data from 
Honolulu ratifies the distinction between commercial use and increased 
usage of excess capacity. 
The data about short-term rentals via various on-line on-demand 
platforms in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, are the most nuanced 
and comprehensive.  The data are presented in a report submitted to the 
Standing Committee on Policy and Strategic Priorities (in the city of 
Vancouver) for consideration of new regulations of short-term rentals.58  
The report reviewed the number of whole-unit listings active in 2015.59  
The data show that 43% of whole-unit listings in 2015 were rented on a 
nightly basis for fewer than thirty days that year, 19% were available 
between thirty-one to sixty days, and 12% were available between sixty-one 
to ninety days.60  Conversely, 4% of entire units were available for more 
than nine months, and 8% were available for six to nine months.61 
                                                                                                             
 53 See generally Dayne Lee, How Airbnb Short-Term Rentals Exacerbate Los Angeles’s 
Affordable Housing Crisis:  Analysis and Policy Recommendations, 10 HARV.  L. &  POL’Y  
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leases dozens of other Airbnb listings.  
Id. at 234. 
 54 Honolulu, Hawaii—Airbnb Data and Analytics, AIRDNA, https://www.airdna.co/ 
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 55 Honolulu, Hawaii—Airbnb Data and Analytics, AIRDNA, https://www.airdna.co/ 
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 58 KAYE KRISHNA, CITY OF VANCOUVER, REGULATING SHORT-TERM RENTALS IN 
VANCOUVER (2016), http://council.vancouver.ca/20161005/documents/pspc1c.pdf. 
 59 Id. at 5, 29. 
 60 Id. at 5–6. 
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The housing data, therefore, show consistently that the use of on-demand 
rental platforms varies with respect to the extent of underutilization.  The 
majority of properties are offered by lessors who use the increased excess 
capacity of their principal residency, while a substantial minority of lessors 
use these platforms to rent their properties not based on increased 
utilization but as a commercial use. 
When it comes to the on-demand transportation arena, there are no 
available data on the number of drivers who use their private car 
(designated for leisure) and monetize it for commercial use versus those 
who use a car designated primarily for commercial use.  However, 
anecdotal evidence shows that a nontrivial number of drivers use a car that 
they bought or rented for the primary purpose of driving passengers.62  
Uber, the world’s largest on-demand transportation company, has programs 
helping drivers to rent, lease, or buy a car.63  Uber’s Xchange leasing 
program enables drivers with insufficient (or no) credit to lease a car,64 
without mileage restrictions, and includes maintenance of the vehicle.65  
Similarly, Lyft, Uber’s main competitor, maintains the Express Drive 
Rental Car Program, which helps its drivers to rent a car.66  The rental’s 
price depends on the number of hours the driver works for Lyft: the greater 
the hours, the cheaper the rental price.67 
Beyond the increased utilization of the goods used, sellers in the on-
demand economy can also capitalize on their free hours.  Thus, the 
distinction here is between those who use their underutilized labor or 
skills—by working for on-demand firms part time and selling hours that are 
not available for their full-time job—and those who work full time for on-
demand platforms, just like incumbents do.  One way to discern the scale of 
this distinction (or, more accurately, the spectrum) is through the worker’s 
reliance on the income she makes from her work for the platforms. 
                                                                                                             
 62 See Nicole Dieker, Where do Uber and Lyft Drivers Get Their Cars? They Rent Them 
From Another Startup, BILLFOLD (Apr. 13, 2015), https://thebillfold.com/where-do-uber-
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 63 Vehicle Solutions, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/vehicle-solutions/ (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2017). 
 64 See Eric Newcomer & Olivia Zaleski, Inside Uber’s Auto-Lease Machine, Where 
Almost Anyone Can Get a Car, BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-31/inside-uber-s-auto-lease-machine-
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 65 See Harry Campbell, Uber Vehicle Marketplace, RIDESHARE GUY, 
http://therideshareguy.com/uber-vehicle-marketplace/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2017). 
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326 University of Hawai‘i Law Review  /  Vol. 39:315 
A study by Requests for Startups examined the level of income that 
workers in the on-demand economy rely on.68  The authors surveyed 
approximately 900 workers in seventy-eight on-demand firms, including 
Airbnb, DoorDash, Homejoy, Thumbtack, Uber, Lyft, and TaskRabbit.69  It 
found that 39% of such workers rely on this work for a quarter of their 
income; 19% of workers, for 25–50%; 13% of workers, for 50–75%; and 
29% of workers for 75–100% of their income.70   
Other studies confirm the same result.  A survey of approximately 600 
Uber drivers, conducted in December 2014, found that almost 40% have no 
other job, roughly 30% had another full-time job, and another 30% had 
another part-time job.71  A McKinsey report found that 40% of Uber drivers 
in the United States earn their primary living through the platform, but just 
7% of those who rent properties on Airbnb rely on it as their primary source 
of income.72  Thus, workers in the on-demand economy fall on a spectrum 
of utilization of hours:  some work part time, as a gig, while for a good 
portion of workers—between 30% and 40%—the on-demand economy is 
their main or only source of income.73 
In conclusion, the on-demand economy shows a range of use predicated 
on increased use of excess capacity.  On one end of that range, some people 
work intermittently, leveraging their personal capital to produce otherwise 
unrealized income.  At other end are those who exploit the on-demand 
platform to commercialize use without leveraging their idle capacity. 
                                                                                                             
 68 See Jennifer Rossa, The Workers, BLOOMBERG BRIEF (June 15, 2015), 
https://newsletters.briefs.bloomberg.com/document/4vz1acbgfrxz8uwan9/the-workers-
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 71 See Jonathan V. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s 
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No. 587, 2015) (describing LEVIN, supra note 22, a survey conducted by the Benenson 
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II. THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF WORK IN EXCESS 
CAPACITY 
So far I have shown that activities in the on-demand economy fall on a 
spectrum based on the level of use or non-use of increased utilization of 
good, time, or skills.  This Section investigates the financial and societal 
consequences that activities on each side of the spectrum create.  Part A 
explores the different influences that each activity has on expansion of 
choice to consumers and providers.  Part B analyzes the other negative and 
positive externalities that each activity produces. 
A. Increased Utilization as a Choice-Enhancing Mechanism 
Viewed through the prism of choice, the main value of the on-demand 
economy is expanding the range of work options that revolve around 
increased use of excess capacity.  As I explain below, while the ability to 
work through using one’s excess skills or property has long existed, the on-
demand economy makes such work more readily offered, available, and 
used.  At the same time, work that is situated on the other end of the 
spectrum of increased utilization can result, and in fact has resulted, in 
decreased choice of other valuable options. 
Choice is a central concept in a liberal democracy.74  Choice is closely 
associated with autonomy because it allows people to self-determine the 
course of their lives.75  Human beings know best what their preferences are 
and are thus best situated to make their own choices.76  As stated famously 
by John Stuart Mill, “The human faculties of perception, judgment, 
discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are 
exercised only in making a choice.”77  Other philosophers have expanded 
on the importance of choice because “autonomous individuals shape their 
lives on their own terms and this self-creative activity is exercised primarily 
through choice.”78  Thus, generally, facilitating choice is one of the main 
responsibilities of lawmakers in a liberal state.79 
The on-demand economy, especially when employed by casual sellers, 
contributes to the expansion of choice.  Undoubtedly, the practice of 
                                                                                                             
 74 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CHOOSING NOT TO CHOOSE:  UNDERSTANDING THE VALUE OF 
CHOICE X (2015). 
 75 See id. 
 76 See id. 
 77 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 65 (Emery Neff ed., 1926). 
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 79 See Aloni, supra note 15, at 1431–33. 
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maximizing otherwise underutilized goods and time existed long before the 
on-demand economy.80  Working as a freelance in a flexible setting, in 
small gigs, and as an “independent contractor” predated the on-demand 
economy.81  Renting properties for short periods while away also preceded 
the on-demand economy but was done through more conventional and less 
efficient methods, such as publishing an ad in a newspaper.82  Carpooling 
and other forms of collaborative transportation are also far from new.83 
Yet, the on-demand economy intensifies the opportunities to maximize 
underutilized goods and time.  The introduction of simple-to-use 
technology offers a greater supply of otherwise wasted capital and labor 
because more people can now easily offer their idle capacity for sale.84  
These platforms reduce the expense of creating such transactions and 
enable the sale of one’s merchantability with little or no cost.  In so doing, 
the on-demand economy eases barriers to entry into markets that were 
previously reserved primarily for professionals.85  Simultaneously, the on-
demand economy increases choice and supply “by allowing users to slice 
up time and space into smaller units.”86  That is, by facilitating the 
connection between peers, the on-demand economy enables suppliers to sell 
smaller portions of their time and goods in an efficient manner.  
Accordingly, the on-demand economy “reduces barriers to entry into 
transactions, allows non-expert participants to exchange services and goods 
and to sell smaller segments of their labor, and therefore enables another 
layer of market choice.”87  The result is more valuable choices for 
consumers and workers alike. 
For consumers, the on-demand economy is beneficial in accommodating 
different types of values and preferences.88  Individuals perceive what is 
important in diverse ways, and the excess-capacity model supports 
increased diversity of choices by making options more easily accessible.89  
                                                                                                             
 80 See Lobel, supra note 14, at 131. 
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 85 See id. at 110–11. 
 86 See id. at 108. 
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 88 See id. at 1413–14. 
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Hence, if a consumer prefers staying at a unit offered by a resident and 
viewing the location from the eye of a local, the on-demand platforms 
enable this.  But if one is more risk-averse and would like to avoid any 
hazard (such as finding that the unit is different from what was described, 
or located in a less favorable part of the city), a hotel may be a better 
option.  Some consumers care more about hygiene and would prefer to stay 
at a hotel for that reason.90  Some passengers show a preference for 
knowing the exact time that their Lyft driver will arrive, while others may 
not have a smartphone, or prefer to pay cash for the transaction (which is 
not an option with Uber or Lyft), or may be in a rush—so favor catching a 
taxi on the street.91  Some consumers view Uber as safer, while other view 
taxis as safer; some care more about the price than others.92  Indeed, in a 
survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers, 32% of respondents 
indicated that “more choice in the marketplace” is a strong selling point for 
on-demand transportation platforms.93  The bottom line is that the on-
demand economy offers consumers another layer of market choice that fits 
their particular preferences. 
For providers, the on-demand economy offers the opportunity to work in 
a flexible framework, in small gigs, to capitalize on their unused time in 
order to earn some supplementary income.94  In reducing barriers to 
entrance into industries, the on-demand economy also allows 
nonprofessional players to leverage their unused skills—from driving to 
cooking—for the purpose of making extra money.95 
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A study conducted by McKinsey Global Institute and published in 
October 2016 examines several aspects of independent contractors across 
six countries, including the United States.96  The study was not limited to 
workers in the on-demand economy, as freelancers who work for on-
demand platforms constituted 15% of the workers surveyed.97  It found that 
a significant proportion of all casual workers—approximately 70%—were 
freelancers by choice, rather than because they were unable to find a full-
time alternative.98  This segment of workers emphasized the degree of 
flexibility and autonomy that this job framework offers them.99  Thus, the 
report elaborates: “Many earners strongly prefer the autonomy and 
flexibility of independent work.  They value being their own boss, setting 
their own hours to some extent, and focusing on work that interests them 
[. . .] The Uber driver can fit his hours around a class schedule or family 
priorities.”100  When it came to workers in the on-demand economy, the 
report found that, in the United States, 87% of workers for this industry 
chose this working pattern rather than selecting it as a necessity (because 
they could not find a different type of job).101  Other data, provided by 
Uber, indicate that Uber drivers appreciate the flexibility in their work.  
Asked how they decide when to work, 40% of drivers answered that it 
depends on what else is on their schedule.102 
At the same time, the impact of the on-demand economy can also 
translate into reduced choice for consumers and workers.  As a result of the 
competition posed by the on-demand industries, some traditional 
(conventional) services that are not provided via platforms are at risk of 
becoming scarcer or disappearing altogether.  This is especially true when 
the on-demand economy promotes suppliers who work commercially (not 
in utilization of idle capacity).  Without regulation that distinguishes these 
types of activities, the alternatives that incumbents offer cannot withstand 
the competition, and reduction of such services has resulted. 
For instance, one traditional service that may be endangered is traditional 
taxicabs.  The entrance of the Transportation Network Companies (“TNC,” 
essentially the on-demand transportation companies) into the market has led 
to a considerable contraction of the number of taxicab rides.  The UCLA 
Labor Center studied the economic implications for the taxi industry in Los 
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Angeles and documented how the entrance of Lyft and Uber gave rise to 
significant shrinkage in the number of rides.103  It found that, between 2013 
and 2014, taxi ridership dropped by 18%, a total of 1.4 million fewer trips 
than the previous year.104  This number is likely bigger now as, at the time 
of the study, Lyft and Uber were not allowed to pick up passengers from 
LAX airport, a route that constituted a large source of rides exclusively for 
taxicabs.105  In Seattle, after Uber and Lyft became authorized to pick up 
passengers from the airport, every month showed a further decline in the 
number of taxi rides:  from –9.5% in June 2016 to –16.6% in August 
2016.106  In Arlington, Virginia, dispatched cab trips saw a steep reduction 
in just two years: falling from 2.6 million annually to 1.7 million annually 
between 2013 and 2015.107  The resultant financial struggles have forced 
cab companies to fire workers, file for bankruptcy, and even close entirely, 
making taxi services less available to the general public in some regions.108 
The decreased availability of traditional services constitutes a problem 
for consumers who need greater protections.  For instance, traditional 
taxicabs are an important choice for some consumers, especially minorities.  
This is because people who are part of minority groups may feel safer 
taking a traditional taxi or find it harder to get rides through on-demand 
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transportation companies.  Researchers from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology recently tested whether being perceived as an African 
American passenger makes it harder to get a ride with Lyft and Uber.109  In 
Seattle, the study found that African American passengers had to wait 
longer before booking a ride via Uber—up to a 35% increase in waiting 
time compared with their white counterparts.110  In Boston, the study used 
passengers with African American–sounding names and found that Uber 
drivers cancelled rides more than twice as frequently as they cancelled rides 
for passengers with white-sounding names.111  No doubt, racial 
discrimination by traditional taxi drivers is a familiar and well-established 
fact, which occurs on a regular basis.112  However, while a host of federal 
and state laws forbid traditional taxicabs from discriminating based on 
race,113 the applicability of these laws to the on-demand drivers, and firms 
themselves, is a more contested question.114 
Further, people with disabilities have documented cases in which Uber 
drivers refused to take them, either because the latter had service animals or 
used a wheelchair.115  In a lawsuit filed by the National Federation of the 
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Blind of California, Uber argued that the Americans with Disabilities Act 
does not apply to them.116  While Uber and Lyft have recently started to 
offer services that can accommodate people who rely on wheelchairs, 
consumers have complained that these services are rarely available.117 
Finally, some people who feel more vulnerable may believe that they are 
safer taking taxis than using an on-demand platform for their rides.  While 
there is no definitive indication that taxis are safer than TNCs, or that many 
people perceive taxis as safer, anecdotal evidence explains why individuals 
may feel safer using taxis; thus, publicized reports in which TNC drivers 
attacked, harassed, or refused to pick up transgender individuals may deter 
some from choosing this option.118  This hesitation may be bolstered on 
account of a few widely reported incidents of TNC drivers who raped or 
sexually assaulted passengers,119 as well as by the TNC firms’ refusal to 
fingerprint their drivers as taxi drivers do.120  The bottom line is that, for 
some people, the availability of traditional taxicabs is still an essential 
option because the on-demand economy alternative is viewed as more 
risky. 
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http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/23/technology/uber-travis-kalanick-ges-fingerprinting/. 
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Relatedly, the short-term on-demand platforms may threaten the 
existence of valuable options of traditional accommodations, such as lower-
end hotels.  Competition with the on-demand platform has endangered 
lower-end hotels because the more luxurious hotels are more likely than 
short-term on-demand rental platforms to attract businesspeople and 
wealthier tourists.121  Indeed, a recent study concluded that Airbnb’s impact 
on the hotel industry in Texas is unevenly distributed because Airbnb 
affects mostly lower-end hotels, making them more vulnerable to economic 
harm.122 
Reduced options to stay in a less expensive hotel can have the most 
serious impact on those who cannot afford the more luxurious options or 
who find it harder to book a room through the on-demand economy housing 
platforms.  Some have good reasons to persist in using traditional services:  
some individuals are more risk averse; others lack the technological access 
required to book such stay; still others may face discrimination in finding a 
room via on-demand platforms.123  A recent study found that prospective 
Airbnb lessees with names perceived to be distinctively African American 
were 16% less likely to succeed in booking a stay than users with identical 
profiles but who had names that are considered distinctively white 
names.124  For these consumers, the survival of traditional options can be 
especially vital. 
Finally, and importantly, another aspect in which the on-demand 
economy decreases choice—particularly when work is not in utilization of 
excess capacity—is in its effect on the number of long-term rentals 
available on the housing market.  Viewed through this lens, while 
consumers may enjoy more choice when they travel, they may find it harder 
to find a long-term rental to live in, in their own city (if they reside in a 
                                                                                                             
 121 See Lobel, supra note 14, at 115 (“In general, Airbnb competes more directly with 
bargain and boutique independent hotels, while luxury hotels and bigger hotel chains, which 
cater to business clients, are less affected.”). 
 122 See Georgios Zervas, Davide Prosperio & John Byers, The Rise of the Sharing 
Economy:  Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry 30 (Boston U. Sch. Mgmt. 
Research, Working Paper No. 2013-16, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2366898. 
 123 See Aloni, supra note 15, at 1424 (“On the other hand, P2P services are not available 
to everyone because they require a credit or debit card, an internet-connected computer, and 
sometimes a smartphone. Smartphone ownership, however, correlates with income level and 
age.”). 
 124 See Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in the 
Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment 1 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper 
No. 16-069, 2016), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/16-069_5c3b2b36-
d9f8-4b38-9639-2175aaf9ebc9.pdf. 
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location with a thriving short-term rental market).125  This is because of the 
trend of converting long-term units to short-term rentals.  This development 
has led to further housing shortages and price increases in the long-term 
rental market. 
To understand this phenomenon and its consequences, it is first important 
to recognize the financial incentive in taking an apartment off of the long-
term rental market and renting it short term.  Almost always, renting the 
unit for short term yields considerable more money than renting it long 
term.126  Take Honolulu, Hawaiʻi:  according to AirDNA, a company that 
provides analytics of Airbnb businesses—as a means to advise people 
where it is best to invest in properties for Airbnb—the average monthly rent 
of a one-bedroom (long-term rental) is around $1,300; the average Airbnb 
monthly revenue from one bedroom is $2,800; and lessors who are at the 
ninetieth percentile of Airbnb’s revenue in Honolulu (the most successful 
lessors in the area) can earn as much as $4,550 a month.127  Thus, in 
Honolulu, converting a unit from long term to short term, on average, 
would yield more than double—and possibly triple, almost quadruple—the 
lessor’s revenue.  Honolulu is in no way unique:  data from all other main 
metropolitan cities reveal the incentive in taking apartments off the long-
term market.  In Vancouver, British Columbia, renting a one-bedroom unit 
for nine to twelve days (depending on the area) would yield the same 
revenue as a monthly long-term rental.128 
Because of this level of monetary incentive, gradually, more rental 
apartments are taken off the market, and their removal contributes to 
housing shortages and rent surges.129  Particularly in tight markets, 
reductions of available units are likely to increase rental prices.130  This 
impact is already noticeable in several cities.  In October 2014, the New 
                                                                                                             
 125 See Aloni, supra note 15, at 1449 (“[A nonintervention approach] increases choice for 
some tourists and affords extra income for renters, but those limited benefits come at the 
price of harm to others—neighbors, hotels, and taxpayers.”). 
 126 See Lee, supra note 53, at 234 (“So long as a property owner or leaseholder can earn a 
substantial premium from Airbnb rather than renting to city residents, there is an 
overpowering incentive to ‘hotelize’ entire buildings . . . .”). 
 127 See Scott Shatford, The Best Places to Buy Airbnb Investment Property in America, 
AIRDNA (Aug. 11, 2015), http://blog.airdna.co/most-profitable-airbnb-cities-in-america/. 
 128 KRISHNA, supra note 58, at 8. 
 129 See, e.g., Carolyn Said, The Airbnb Effect, S.F. CHRONICLE (July 12, 2015), 
http://www.sfchronicle.com/airbnb-impact-san-francisco-2015/#1 (finding that in San 
Francisco at least 350 entire homes listed on Airbnb appear to be full-time vacation  
rentals—in a city “wracked by a housing crisis, where a typical year sees just 2,000 new 
units added, a few hundred units off the market makes a significant dent”). 
 130 See Lee, supra note 53, at 237 (“In tight housing markets with near-zero vacancy 
rates, a sudden reduction in supply naturally increases rents, particularly because neither the 
market nor the public sector can swiftly add to the housing stock.”). 
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York Office of the Attorney General released a report about the impact of 
Airbnb on housing availability in New York City.131  It found that over 
4,600 units were available on Airbnb as short-term rentals for more than 
three months and therefore were unavailable for long-term residents—and 
that the number of such units is likely even larger.132  A more recent study, 
commissioned by the Housing Conservation Coordinators and MFY Legal 
Services, used the most rigorous method to measure the impact of Airbnb 
on long-term rental availability in NYC.  The study documented units that 
they define as “impact listing”—meaning that the listings, in 2015, were (1) 
an entire unit; (2) a regular short-term rental, meaning the unit was booked 
for short periods more than once per month and had at least one nonbooked 
day per month; and (3) commercial, meaning the unit was listed for at least 
three months in the year by the lessor, who listed more than one unit on 
Airbnb, or was listed for at least six months a year by the lessor, who listed 
only one unit on Airbnb.133  These “impact units” are properties that are 
most likely for commercial use, unavailable for long-term rent, and thus 
have the strongest negative impact on housing availability.134  The study 
found that, in 2015, nearly 16%—or 8,058 listings—of all Airbnb listings in 
New York City fell under the definition of impact listings.135  Returning 
these units to the long-term market, the report estimates, would increase 
housing availability by 10%.  Further, because the Airbnb market is most 
active in Manhattan, releasing these units back to the market would increase 
the number of vacant units for long-term rental in Manhattan by 21%.136 
In a similar vein, the employment structure that on-demand companies 
employ can also prompt a reduction of choices for workers, specifically for 
traditional employment opportunities in which the worker is defined as an 
“employee.”  Most on-demand firms classify their workers as “independent 
contractors.”137  This classification saves the firms large amounts of money, 
                                                                                                             
 131 See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., AIRBNB IN THE CITY (2016), 
https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/AIRBNB%20REPORT.pdf. 
 132 Id. at 12. 
 133 See HÉBER MANUEL DELGADO-MEDRANO & KATIE LYON, BJH ADVISORS, 
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 134 Id. at 17. 
 135 Id. at 26. 
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 137 See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber:  Defining Employment in 
the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1686 (2016); see also Zenelaj v. Handybook, 
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because they do not need to offer these workers various employment 
protections such as reimbursement of work-related expenses, overtime 
payment, employer contributions to unemployment insurance,138 and 
minimum wages.139  As an example, according to one estimate, “Uber can 
save up to thirty percent in payroll taxes simply by classifying its drivers as 
nonemployees.”140 
The expansion of the on-demand economy, especially when workers do 
not provide only “gigs” but, rather, derive most of their income from this 
work, can culminate in a decrease of traditional, protected positions.  For 
example, in the transportation sector, the entrance of Uber and Lyft into the 
market precipitated a significant drop in the number of taxicab jobs.141  Not 
all taxi drivers are defined as “employees”—even in the traditional-sector 
taxi industry, some work as independent contractors.142  A worker’s 
classification as “employee” versus “independent contractor” depends on 
the level of control that the employer retains over the worker.143  But many 
of them are classified as employees, making them recipients of a host of 
benefits, as noted above—thus, such positions are now more difficult to 
gain. 
                                                                                                             
 138 See, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1073–74 (N.D. Cal. 2015).  In that 
case, the court stated: 
[W]hether a worker is classified as an employee or an independent contractor has great 
consequences. California law gives many benefits and protections to employees; 
independent contractors get virtually none.  Employees are generally entitled to, among 
other things, minimum wage and overtime pay, meal and rest breaks, reimbursement for 
work-related expenses, workers’ compensation, and employer contributions to 
unemployment insurance.  
Id. at 1073–74 (internal citations omitted). 
 139 Robert Sprague, Worker (Mis)classification in the Sharing Economy:  Trying to Fit 
Square Pegs Into Round Holes, 31 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 53, 72 (2015) (“It is often 
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 140 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 137, at 1686. 
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 142 See, e.g., NLRB. v. Friendly Cab Co., Inc., 512 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that taxi drivers are employees); Yellow Cab Coop. Inc. v. Worker’s Comp. 
Appeals Bd., 277 Cal. Rptr. 434, 436–38 (finding that taxi drivers were “employees” for 
workers’ compensation purposes). 
 143 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 137, at 1691 (“Nearly every employment 
protection depends on the existence of an employer-employee relationship, and every 
employment test considers the level of control that putative employers retain over 
workers.”). 
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As stated, the McKinsey Global Institute assessed that 87% of workers in 
the on-demand economy work by choice rather than due to an inability to 
find other gainful employment.144  However, this means that 13% of 
workers work in the on-demand economy because they cannot find full-
time stable employment.  But a different study, which surveyed providers in 
the on-demand economy, found that “41 percent say they prefer the security 
and benefits of working for a traditional company even if it might mean less 
flexibility.”145  Which is why the accurate number is a debatable question.  
But there is no doubt that the rise of the on-demand economy—and 
especially its lack of regulation with regard to employment rights—results 
in the reduction of stable employment opportunities. 
The reduction of choice for consumers and workers is correlated to the 
spectrum of utilization players use in the on-demand economy. For 
consumers, it may not matter if the product they buy derived from casual or 
commercial work.  But the consequences that stem from the magnitude of 
commercial work can eventually mean less choice for consumers.  
Infrequent casual work in increased excess capacity accordingly has less 
impact on the reduction of choice.  For providers, the distinction is more 
obvious: as unregulated work in excess-in-disguise grows more common, 
the fewer options exist for traditional, protected work.  Hence, choice and 
level of utilization of excess capacity are correlated.    
B. Other Negative Externalities 
In addition to the expansion or reduction of choice, activities from 
opposite ends of the utilization spectrum produce different levels of 
negative externalities.  Activities in increased excess capacity produce 
fewer negative externalities, whereas commercial use without utilization of 
excess capacity typically produces more negative externalities. 
In the short-term on-demand rental market, the magnitude of negative 
externalities attached to commercial use of short-term rentals is 
noticeable.146  To be sure, casually renting a unit every once in a while can 
produce some negative externalities, too, such as nuisance and safety 
                                                                                                             
 144 BUGHIN ET AL., supra note 72, at 41. 
 145 See Press Release, Penn Schoen Berland, Forty-Five Million Americans Say They 
Have Worked in the On-Demand Economy, While 86.5 Million Have Used It, According to 
New Survey (Jan. 6, 2016), http://psbresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/On-
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 146 See KRISHNA, supra note 58, at 7–11 (reporting on a survey of residents in Vancouver 
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by residents referencing Airbnb or other short-term rentals).  
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concerns.147  Having strangers in a building can make the residents feel less 
safe; it can create extra noise by people who come to vacation; it can also 
generate some added pressure on shared resources—from recycling and 
trash, to parking and elevators, to gym usage (where one exists).148  
However, when one rents an apartment via platforms consistently and 
commercially, the magnitude of these harms grows;149 e.g.,  from 
occasionally seeing unfamiliar faces in the hallway and parking areas to 
seeing different unfamiliar faces all the time, from intermittent noise to 
more constant noise, and so on.   
The use of short-term rentals that do not involve utilization of excess 
space, in residences that are not designed to operate as hotels, intensifies 
these setbacks.  Indeed, in a survey conducted in Vancouver, British 
Columbia, 42% of those questioned said that short-term rentals reduce 
safety in buildings and neighborhoods, and 41% said that they increase 
noise and property damage.150 
Lara Williams, an author and freelance writer who lives in Manchester, 
UK, describes the major inconvenience and noise she experienced from an 
apartment adjacent to hers, which was converted to be a short-term rental 
unit.151  She experienced loud noise, parties, music, and even “men 
wrestling on the floor outside my flat, someone trying to kick in my door, 
and fights that have left blood smears across the corridor walls.”152  Lara 
recognizes the distinction between commercial use and renting short term 
by increased utilization.  She writes, “I had nothing against someone trying 
to make a little extra cash over the weekend.  It was when it became clear 
the property was being entirely used for short-term rentals, and after my 
second phone call to the police, that I started complaining.”153  This seems 
to be a common view:  many people agree that their neighbors should be 
able to leverage their underutilized goods, but they do not want to live next 
to what functions as a semi–hotel room.154 
                                                                                                             
 147 See id. at 11. 
 148 See id. 
 149 See generally O’NEIL & OUYANG, supra note 42. 
 150 KRISHNA, supra note 58, at 8. 
 151 See Lara Williams, When Airbnb Rentals Turn Into Nuisance Neighbours, THE 
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What is more, the nuisance resulting from vast conversions to short-term 
rentals in residential areas threatens to change the nature of entire 
neighborhoods.  In popular tourist destinations, which are very profitable 
for operators of short-terms, residents report that the short-term market 
facilitated through the platforms has promoted nuisance, noise, and feelings 
of insecurity.155  People who live in residential areas have found themselves 
neighboring with hotel-like operations.  As described by a report written by 
the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy: 
In Venice [California], as many as 12.5 percent of all housing units have 
become AirBnB units, all without public approval.  There are 360 AirBnB 
units per square mile in Venice and longtime residents who never intended to 
live next to hotels now find themselves dealing with noise and safety concerns 
that negatively impact their quality of life.156 
The ramifications of on-demand platforms on the availability of long-
term rentals can also contribute to changes in the character of a community.  
If an area is populated with apartments that are rented only short term, 
when they are not booked these units remain empty.157  At the same time, 
local residents cannot find homes—due to the housing shortage and 
increase in prices—and have to leave the area.158  As described by a 
resident of Marfa, Texas:  “Instead of having someone live in that house 
who’s contributing to the community, you’re turning the house into a place 
that gets rented out a couple of times a month.”159 
Another negative externality of short-term rentals via on-demand 
platforms is reduction in revenue from transient occupancy tax (aka, hotel 
tax).160  Hotel taxes are used in big cities to facilitate collaboration between 
the city and the hotel industry.161  The hotel collects the taxes for the city or 
state to use for infrastructure, such as convention centers and transportation, 
that attracts tourism.162  Thus, when more visitors stay in short-term 
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residences rather than hotels, the result is less revenue to the city.163  In 
some municipalities this is no longer a problem, as Airbnb has started to 
collect the tax for the city.164  In other municipalities, this is still a 
problem.165  And regarding hotel tax, too, there is a difference between 
increased use and commercial use.  When a unit is rented full time, it is 
likely to be in an area that is already highly attractive to tourists.166  The 
implication is that a large number of visitors who use the infrastructures 
funded by hotel taxes do not contribute to this use; conversely, the loss of 
revenue from casual lessees is less significant because their number is 
smaller.  Further, when one rents an excess-capacity unit only rarely, it can 
be located in areas that are further from “the tourist path” and thus bring 
more economic activity to such areas (these are also generally areas that 
receive less direct benefit from hotel tax revenue).167 
The same holds true with regard to commercial use of TNCs:  it is likely 
to produce more negative externalities than increased-utilization driving 
does.168  To be sure, work as a driver in increased utilization also produces 
some negative externalities; the difference between the externalities that 
commercial versus casual use creates lies in their magnitude.169  The 
expansion of TNC services can increase the number of cars on the road and, 
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therefore, create more air pollution and traffic congestion.170  This is 
because, unlike with taxicabs, there is no cap on the number of automobiles 
that TNCs use.171  Further, there is a risk that passengers may use public 
transportation less frequently, because TNC services serve as an alternative 
option to public transportation.172  And only infrequently do TNCs serve as 
replacements for car ownership, so they do not decrease in significant ways 
the number of cars on the street.173  They mainly serve as an alternative to 
taxis.174  Indeed, there are some strong indications that the lower prices of 
TNC rides generate greater numbers of rides than would otherwise exist 
with traditional taxis.175  In NYC, there has been debate on the impact of 
TNCs on traffic, with contradictory evidence produced by both sides.  On 
the one side, in January 2016, the Office of the Mayor published a long-
awaited report on the connection between TNCs and intensified traffic in 
Manhattan.176  The report concluded that “E-dispatch is a contributor to 
overall congestion, but did not drive the recent increase in congestion in the 
CBD [Manhattan’s Central Business District].”177  This report, however, 
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was criticized for its unclear methodology and lack of data about the way 
conclusions were generated.178  
Other accounts claim the opposite: a recent report concluded, “TNCs 
accounted for the addition of 600 million miles of vehicular travel to the 
city’s roadway network [between 2013 and 2016] . . . . exceed[ing] the total 
mileage driven by yellow cabs in Manhattan.”179  This report, as well as 
others, argues that the TNCs accrue more rides and numbers of vehicles on 
the streets while they trim the number of rides in public transportation.180  
Other data from San Francisco and London show similar consequences: a 
swell in number of rides, a surge in traffic congestion, and concerns about 
air quality as a result.181 
Additional negative externalities may appear as more people work in 
TNCs as super drivers.  The growing number of untrained drivers can 
increase the number of car accidents.  In municipalities that charge a tax for 
each taxi ride but have not enacted a similar duty on the TNCs, tax 
revenues are reduced. 
To conclude, the magnitude of work that is not based on increased use of 
excess capacity does most of the job of producing more negative 
extremities here.  It does that by enlarging the number of transactions and 
by making the type of work offered more comparable to that of traditional 
offerings.  As such, it threatens the rationales that existing regulations are 
grounded in, like limiting the number of taxis on the road, increasing 
revenues from tax collection, or controlling nuisances through zoning laws. 
III. PRINCIPLES OF REGULATORY APPROACH 
Activities of the on-demand economy create different levels of negative 
and positive externalities, often in correlation with their position on the 
                                                                                                             
 178 See Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Uber Not to Blame for Rise in Manhattan Traffic 
Congestion, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/01/16/nyregion/uber-not-to-blame-for-rise-in-manhattan-traffic-congestion-report-
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 179 SCHALLER, supra note 172, at 5. 
 180 See Steven Hill, Uber is a Nightmare:  They’re Selling a Big Lie–And the New York 
Times Keeps Buying It, SALON (Apr. 9, 2016, 11:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/ 
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_buying_it/. 
 181 See id. (“Ed Reiskin, director of transportation for San Francisco’s Municipal 
Transportation Agency, says, ‘[Uber and Lyft] have put . . .’ an estimated 15,000 [more] 
autos [on the streets] in San Francisco alone . . . . In London, a study by the Department for 
Transport found that the rise of taxi apps such as Uber has played a part in worsening 
congestion.”). 
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spectrum of utilization.182  As such, apposite regulations should aim to 
differentiate between the two types of activities and treat each with a 
separate set of rules.  This Section provides some basic principles of 
regulation that embody this concept, while looking at municipalities that 
have enacted policies incorporating some of these principles—successfully 
and unsuccessfully. 
The first principle involves capturing the distinction between work in 
increased excess capacity and activity that is not based on increased 
utilization.  Namely, lawmakers should craft regulations that discern when 
work in increased utilization transforms into an activity that is more akin to 
traditional commercial work.  Regulations, thus, should prevent incumbent-
like providers from passing as increased-excess providers in order to evade 
regulation governing the traditional sectors. 
How can policymakers design rules to distinguish between activities that 
derive from increased utilization and those that do not?  When cataloging 
different undertakings, lawmakers ought to look at two factors together:  the 
frequency of supply and the infrastructure used for the transaction.  The 
frequency denotes the number of transactions the provider is involved with 
in a defined period.  The more frequently that the supplier provides the 
goods or services, the more likely that she is not working in increased 
excess capacity.  The other distinguishing factor for policymakers to focus 
on is infrastructure:  whether the goods are primarily designated for a 
commercial purpose or only intermittently converted for commercial use.  
If the provider uses her goods predominantly for her own leisure, and only 
occasionally for commercial purposes, this indicates that she is selling idle 
capacity. 
The type of indicators that lawmakers can consider to pinpoint the 
frequency of use and the function of the infrastructure depends on the type 
of regulation at stake.  For example, in determining the appropriate 
employment classification of providers and the protections that workers 
should get, the factors that lawmakers should contemplate include: the 
number of hours the worker puts into the work, the portion of that worker’s 
income derived from this work, the number of miles she drives over a 
period of time, and the function of the vehicle (e.g., private versus rented 
car).  For short-term rentals, lawmakers should take into consideration the 
number of transactions per year (the total nights per year that the provider 
offers the unit on a short-term basis) and whether the provider is a principal 
resident, because these factors indicate whether the provider uses her 
property primarily for commercial purposes. 
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A few municipalities have commenced crafting and implementing 
regulations that aim to distinguish between these different uses.183  While 
the content of these rules are still open to debate and do not embed this 
concept perfectly, they generally delineate what such regulations should 
look like.  California, the first state to legalize and regulate on-demand 
transportation services, defines TNC as an “online-enabled app or platform 
to connect passengers with drivers using their personal vehicles.”184  In 
promulgating these rules, the California Public Utilities Commission said, 
“The primary distinction between a TNC and other TCPs [Transportation 
Charter Permits] is that a TNC connects riders to drivers who drive their 
personal vehicle, not a vehicle such as a limousine purchased primarily for 
a commercial purpose.  To that end, a TNC is not permitted to itself own 
vehicles used in its operation or own fleets of vehicles.”185  The definition, 
thus, relies on the provider’s and firms’ infrastructures:  i.e., whether it is a 
private car used to leverage idle capacity or a car designated predominantly 
for commercial use.  
The interpretation of the term “personal vehicle” is a source of fierce 
debate.186  On the one hand, opponents of on-demand firms argue that 
Uber’s and Lyft’s programs to lease and sell vehicles to their drivers blur 
this line between traditional taxi drivers who use cars designated primarily 
to drive passengers and TNC drivers who, under these programs, do the 
same.187  Thus, critics argue, TNCs that sell and lease cars to their providers 
should abide by traditional regulations.188  On the other hand, the TNCs 
                                                                                                             
 183 See, e.g., Order Instituting Rulemaking on Regulations Relating to Passenger Carriers, 
Ridesharing, and New Online-Enabled Transp. Servs. (Cal. P.U.C. Dec. 27, 2012), 
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M040/K862/40862944.pdf; 
Decision Adopting Rules and Regulations to Protect Public Safety While Allowing New 
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 184 Id. (emphasis added). 
 185 Id. 
 186 See, e.g., S.F. Int’l Airport et al., Reply Comments on the Concept of Personal 
Vehicles, Rulemaking on Regulations Relating to Passenger Carriers, Ridesharing, and New 
Online-Enabled Transp. Servs. (Cal. P.U.C. July 25, 2016), 
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 187 See id. at 1 (“In September 2013, the Commission drew a bright line in its decision to 
recognize and regulate a new type of charter-party carrier . . . . It appears that line is being 
erased.”). 
 188 See id. at 7.  In their concluding discussion, the commentators argued: 
With the proliferation of business relationships between TNCs and car rental agencies 
and manufacturers for the express purpose of providing vehicles to be used for TNC 
services, it seems clear that there is no meaningful difference between TCP limousine 
services and TNC services.  TNCs now control fleets by proxy, and TNC drivers drive 
vehicles procured for purely commercial purposes.  As TNC law continues to evolve, 
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oppose what they perceive as a narrow definition of “personal vehicle”; 
and, further, they contest imposing restrictions based on a vehicle’s 
designation.189  When first promulgating these rules, the Commission did 
not clarify the definition of “personal vehicle.”190  In the second phase of 
rulemaking, the Commission decided to postpone its ruling on the topic 
until the third phase, to allow parties to submit their comments,191 but 
stated, for the time being, that “[l]ease or rental agreements with a term of 
less than four months are not permitted as a form of personal vehicle 
ownership for TNC drivers.”192  In its recent proposed decision regarding 
the definition of “personal vehicle,” the Commission revised its position to 
define “personal vehicle” to mean a vehicle that is “owned, leased, rented 
for a term that does not exceed 30 days[,]” instead of the previous definition 
of “less than four months.”193  Thus, although the issue has still not been 
finally determined, it seems that California’s regulations concerning 
operation of TNCs incorporate distinctions between activities involved with 
excess capacity and those that are not. 
The particular details about where the Commission will draw the line 
between cars for professional use and those involving increased utilization 
are still unclear and subject to modification.194  It is still to be seen whether 
the Commission will embed these characteristics further,195 creating 
                                                                                                             
we urge the Commission to subject TNCs to the same safety requirements imposed on 
TCP limousine services.  
Id. 
 189 See Decision on Phase II Issues and Reserving Additional Issues for Resolution in 
Phase III, at 58 (Cal. P.U.C. Apr. 21, 2016), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/ 
Published/G000/M161/K474/161474505.pdf. 
 190 See id. at 39 (“SFO/MTA requests the Commission amend the scope to:  (1) clarify 
the definition of ‘personal vehicle’ . . . . Below, we clarify the definition of personal vehicles 
. . . .”), 51 (“SFMTA and SFIA claim the definition of personal vehicle is confusing . . . . 
Our clarification is set out . . . above.”).  
 191 Id. at 58 (“The Commission will issue a separate ruling posing questions about . . . the 
definition of personal vehicle for party comment.”). 
 192 Id. at 3. 
 193 See Proposed Decision for Phase III.A.: Definition of Personal Vehicle, at 4 (Cal. 
P.U.C. Dec. 16, 2016), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M171/K329/ 
171329614.pdf.  Compare id., with Decision on Phase II Issues, supra note 189, at 3 
(imposing temporary definition of “personal vehicle”). 
 194 See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 195 On October 26, 2016, the California Public Utilities Commission opened a Phase III 
in the rulemaking proceeding.  Phase III.B. Scoping Memo and Ruling of Assigned Comm’r, 
at 1 (Cal. P.U.C. Apr. 4, 2017), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M183/ 
K388/183388905.pdf.  The Commission separated Phase III into two sub-phases, Phase 
III.A. and Phase III.B.  Id.  On December 15, 2016, the Commission issued a proposed 
decision for Phase III.A, which addresses the definition of “personal vehicle.”  See Proposed 
Decision for Phase III.A., supra note 193.  Although the Commission has not yet adopted 
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genuine distinctions between workers in increased excess capacity and 
those who essentially operate the same as traditional taxicabs but have less 
burdensome regulatory requirements to follow.  In any case, the 
Commission’s work illustrates regulations that attempt to distinguish 
between the two activities based on the infrastructure used. 
In the short-term rental market, some municipalities—to differentiate 
casual lessors from those who do not leverage idle capacity—place a limit 
on the number of nights that residents can lease their properties for short-
term stays.196  The assumption is that a small number of transactions signals 
providers who are merely increasing their utilization of excess capacity, 
while those who exceed this threshold operate commercially.  For example, 
in San Francisco, the threshold is ninety days a year,197 and Seattle has 
introduced a similar restriction (currently pending).198  Vancouver, British 
Columbia, in its pending proposal, has decided not to adopt a distinction 
based on maximum number nights because “tracking and enforcing a 
nightly rental cap is extremely difficult and poses a high administrative 
burden with unpredictable results.”199  Instead, the proposed regulations in 
Vancouver will permit short-term rentals only by those who are defined as 
“principal residents.”200  For a lessor to demonstrate that she is the principal 
resident of a unit, she would have to present evidence that she controls the 
rented unit (as owner or tenant) and provide proof of regular personal 
business at this address—indicated by a utility bill with the lessor’s name or 
other government identification that shows she actually lives at the address 
in question.201  The premise of this “principal resident” proposal is that such 
category distinguishes between units that are primarily for short-term 
rentals and those that are available only through increased utilization. 
                                                                                                             
the Proposed Decision for Phase III.A. because the period for comment on the Proposed 
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 199 KRISHNA, supra note 58, at 17. 
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How should the policymaker decide which on-demand activity crosses 
the line from casual use (work in increased utilization) to commercial 
work?  This is different from the previous query, which was how to 
differentiate between the two activities.  Here, the examination is: at what 
point do lawmakers think an activity is becoming more commercial in 
nature?  How do lawmakers draw such line between activities?  Said 
differently, at what point does an activity considered to produce mainly 
positive externalities morph into one that produces more negative 
externalities?  For instance, in short-term rentals, should the line be set at 
thirty days a year, sixty days a year, ninety days a year?   
Indeed, in some cases, it is not easy to draw the line between pursuits.  
The resolution here should rely on the negative externalities that 
commercial use may produce.  The city of San Francisco decided that 
ninety days a year was the limit, because they evaluated that that was the 
point at which short-term rental revenue would break even with long-term 
rentals (the amount of money a lessor would make renting from a tenant for 
a whole year).202  Thus, if the city allows a provider to offer short-term 
rentals for more than ninety days a year, it incentivizes lessors to convert 
long-term rentals to short-term ones.203 
Further, take, for example, the stories in this Introduction regarding 
individuals who use Airbnb in various ways.  Ryan Scott, who owns twelve 
units in San Diego and manages an additional ten units, is on the extreme 
end of the spectrum (working consistently with new infrastructure and thus 
very likely inflicting damage on the housing market and possibly on the 
fabric of the community).204  Next, Jeannie Ralston, who converted an 
apartment originally used for resident rental to one for short-term rental, 
also does not work in increased excess capacity.205  Conversely, Jordan 
Reeves, a casual user who leases the property when it is otherwise not used, 
                                                                                                             
 202  Contra Emily Green, SF Deals Major Blow to Airbnb with Tough Short-Term Rental 
Law, S.F. GATE (Nov. 15, 2016, 10:26 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/SF-deals-
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 204 See Weisberg, supra note 4. 
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is on the other end of the spectrum—a classic case of someone whose 
activities fall within the utilization of idle capacity.206 
Of all the cases discussed, Michael Naess—who, seventy times per year, 
rents a room within his own property while he is present—introduces the 
most challenging case.207  On the one hand, if we look only at the 
infrastructure he uses, he is clearly leveraging otherwise-dead capital:  the 
extra room in his own home.208  What is more, by always staying in the 
apartment, he insures that his guests are not going to be too noisy or create 
certain kinds of safety concerns; so, his situation avoids some negative 
externalities.209  It is not surprising, then, that such use is almost always 
considered legal.210 
On the other hand, looking at the frequency of transactions and other 
possible negative externalities, we might conclude that his activity is 
somewhere in the middle of the spectrum of utilization.  This is because 
Naess uses the room for short-term rentals constantly (rather than 
casually).211  As a result, his neighbors might feel unsafe or uncomfortable 
having new people in the hallway every few days.  In a municipality in 
which short-term rental owners do not pay hotel tax, it can also mean loss 
of revenue to the city.212  Therefore, Naess’s case presents a challenge in 
drawing the line.  In a world with perfect legislation and no enforcement 
problems, lawmakers may designate it as a “semi-excess capacity” activity 
and impose only some limitations on its use.  But in a less than perfect 
world, the lawmaker will need to decide whether such use crosses the line 
or not. 
After policymakers are able to draw the line and differentiate the two 
activities, the next substantial issue is the content of the regulations:  which 
obligations and rules are attached to each category?  Fundamentally, 
activities in increased utilization produce positive externalities—they offer 
more choice for consumers and providers.  Lawmakers should support the 
innovation and its results by allowing people to leverage their goods, time, 
and skills.  Because transactions based on increased utilization are different 
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350 University of Hawai‘i Law Review  /  Vol. 39:315 
from other, traditional work in the level of negative externalities they 
produce, each category should be governed by a different set of rules.213   
Lawmakers should, thus, create two different categories of activities 
based on the spectrum of excess-capacity utilization.  Activities based on 
increased excess capacity should be regulated lightly and tailored to casual, 
unsophisticated providers.  Traditional work done through platforms should 
be governed by the same rules as incumbents unless there is a significant 
reason justifying a departure from these regulations. 
But this does not mean that transactions in increased excess capacity 
should be a regulation-free zone.  For some types of regulations—such as 
safety—this distinction may not matter at all because lawmakers can 
reasonably insist that, for these critical areas, there is no difference between 
work in increased excess capacity and other work.  A part-time driver can 
cause the same harm as one who drives regularly if she drives an unsafe 
vehicle or without adequate insurance.  Thus, lawmakers should impose 
safety requirements—criminal-background checks, vehicle inspections, 
insurance coverage—in a way that assures public safety and reasonable 
allocation of risk.  The category of activities in increased excess capacity, 
thus, should come under minimal regulation: only to protect safety and 
prevent market failures. 
In other aspects, regulations can take a different form from those 
imposed on incumbents or on incumbent-like work operated through on-
demand platforms.  Hotel tax provides an interesting test case.  San 
Francisco, which created a new regime responding to the problems caused 
by on-demand short-term rentals, imposes on short-term Airbnb 
transactions an occupancy tax (collected by Airbnb) equivalent to that 
levied on hotels.214  However, a regime premised on the distinction between 
transactions on the spectrum of utilization may reasonably levy different tax 
rates for these activities since they may vary in the type of visitors they 
attract and in their use of municipalities’ infrastructures. Hotels are more 
likely to draw businesspeople who use infrastructure as convention centers 
or performing arts centers.215  Conversely, visitors who turn to Airbnb to 
experience a location from a local’s perspective may be less likely to use 
some of these infrastructures.216  Airbnb units offered by casual users also 
may be located in parts of town that are less touristic in their nature; thus, 
                                                                                                             
 213 See supra Part II. 
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revenue from hotel tax is less targeted to these areas.217  Further, as renting 
out rooms or units on a short-term basis provides more business to these 
less-visited municipal areas, lawmakers can even incentivize people to visit 
the areas.218  Thus, unlike the path taken by San Francisco, a municipality 
may be justified in creating a different hotel-tax rate for transactions based 
on casual use. 
Alternatively, municipalities can impose a tax—equal to its “regular” 
hotel tax—on short-term rentals located in the central tourist zones, while 
creating a reduced tax for short-term rentals in other zones.  This should not 
create an extra administrative burden or confusion, because, in regulated 
regimes, lessors must register their units; the city can inform them of their 
hotel tax rate at the time of registration. 
In a similar vein, in employment situations, lawmakers should treat full-
time workers in the on-demand economy differently than they treat casual 
providers in that same economy.  The former are not substantially different 
from traditional employees.  On-demand firms exert a level of control over 
these workers very similar to employers’ control over traditional 
employees.219  In the transportation arena, Uber and Lyft have created 
various programs to incentivize their drivers to provide more hours a 
week—to make them “super-drivers.”220  For instance, Lyft’s Power Driver 
Bonus program requires drivers to put in some minimum hours a week, plus 
maintain a 90% acceptance rate.221  In return, Lyft waives most of its 
commission to drivers who fulfill these requirements, thus granting them 
approximately 20% more than they would otherwise be paid.222  Lyft and 
Uber exert more control over workers who work voluminous hours.  The 
flexibility attendant to the “independent contractor” status is lost once the 
driver is incentivized to work more hours a week and not to refuse riders.  
These drivers’ level of income dependence on the employer is also 
strong.223  Thus, when it comes to workers who are not using their increased 
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excess capacity, they should be recognized as traditional “employees” for 
the purpose of benefits and protections.  Indeed, some courts around the 
world have determined that Uber drivers should be classified as 
“employees.”224 
However, treating such workers as traditional employees does not mean 
that more casual workers (those truly leveraging their excess capacity) 
should not enjoy any rights and benefits.  While these providers are not akin 
to traditional employees and enjoy a degree of flexibility, they should still 
receive basic protections, including minimum wage and overtime pay.  A 
few commentators have proposed that lawmakers create a special 
category—an intermediate level—between employee and independent 
contractor, which includes basic employment protections and benefits.225 So 
far, even jurisdictions that have regulated TNCs have not addressed the 
employment status of workers in that sector.  The problem with this 
omission is that leaves the final decision about employment status to courts.  
Indeed, courts all around the globe are now facing lawsuits on this issue.226  
But courts are limited in what they can do:  they can decide whether 
workers are classified as employees or independent contractors but cannot 
create an intermediate status that incorporates the distinction between those 
who work in increased excess capacity and those who do not. 
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In addition to creating new content, the new rules for the increased 
excess capacity category must be clear and easy to follow, and impose the 
least administrative burdens possible.  They should be designed with the 
awareness that these providers are micro-earners rather than sophisticated 
players with resources to hire legal counsel.  Another benefit of a clear and 
easy-to-follow regulatory regime is that it prevents the lost benefits that 
stem from evasion of the law.  The risk of not having such a regime is a 
market that operates underground, thus reducing revenue from tax 
collection and putting drivers and customers at risk. 
San Francisco provides a tale about how not to do it.  The City created a 
license regime not only limiting the number of nights a lessor may offer her 
unit for short-term use but also requiring registration with the 
municipality.227  The registration is comprised of two steps.  First, the lessor 
must obtain a San Francisco Business Registration Certificate.228  
Afterward, the lessor must schedule an in-person appointment to register 
her unit with the Office of Short-Term Rentals.229  The fee for such 
application, initially set at $50,230 was changed to $250 in November 
2016.231  Lessors are also required to submit a quarterly report detailing all 
of the stays in their units during the past three months.232 
With such an onerous and complicated process, it is not surprising that 
most lessors in San Francisco are out of compliance.233  As of April 2016, 
2,587 lessors had obtained the business registration; yet, as of July 2016, 
only 1,472 had registered with the Office of Short-Term Rentals234 out of at 
least 7,000 entire-units that are regularly offered in San Francisco (and 
likely many more).235  Predictably, the City’s Board of Supervisors 
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attributes some of this massive noncompliance to the complexity of the 
registration.  The board states that “[t]he two-stage process with separate 
business tax registration and short-term rental host registration processes 
might deter or confuse otherwise compliant short-term rental hosts.”236  The 
report also questioned the fact that registration requires physical attendance 
at the office:  “Ideally, the entire registration process could be completed 
online, assuming sufficient mechanisms could be established to verify the 
identity of hosts, as well as home ownership and residency status.  This 
would remove what could be one of the most significant barriers to 
compliance . . . .”237 
Compare San Francisco’s approach to the one currently pending in 
Vancouver.  In recommending a system that will require “principal 
residents” to register if they want to offer their units for short-term rent, the 
process will be “easy to understand, [and] inspires high levels of voluntary 
compliance.”238  To achieve this goal, the proposal states, “Lessons learned 
from short-term rental licensing recommend a simple, inexpensive, online 
licensing system where applicants post copies of the above evidence and 
self-declare the evidence is true and that they will comply with short-term 
rental regulations.”239  The approach taken by Vancouver thus distinguishes 
between casual and commercial users not only by differentiating the 
activities but also by reducing barriers to compliance.  San Francisco’s 
system, which aims to do the same, creates obstacles to participation by 
laypeople who harmlessly wish to capitalize on their underutilized goods. 
In summary, various municipalities are now experimenting with 
regulations that embed these principles.  And while no state, city, or town 
has yet promulgated a perfect set of rules, these initial responses provide a 
good guideline for what works and what does not.  There is a challenge in 
crafting policy that distinguishes between on-demand activities, 
encouraging one and constraining the other.  But there is also some 
promise. 
CONCLUSION 
The on-demand firms and their proponents often emphasize the way that 
microearners—nonprofessional providers—are now able to participate in 
markets that were previously reserved to incumbents.  The new economy is 
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equalizing in allowing anyone, without the need to invest in new materials, 
the chance to maximize her skills, time, and goods.240  In this tale, the new 
economy disrupts monopolies, obsolete regulations, and corrupted 
industries.241  Those who oppose this view are portrayed as self-serving or 
as oppositionists to innovation who cannot get used to new technologies.242  
For consumers, it is easy to buy into this narrative.  They see that they are 
now paying less for accommodations at their favorite tourist destinations 
and they can find cheaper rides.243  For others, renting their home 
occasionally is a means to survive the growing cost of housing and other 
basic services.244  Imposing restrictions on such usage reasonably seems 
like hampering a legitimate way to improve their well-being. 
But this narrative ignores a sea change that is occurring under the 
auspices of the storyline proffered by the on-demand firms, their lobbyists, 
and their supporters.245  The on-demand economy opens a wide door to 
those who are far from being laypersons who maximize their underutilized 
excess capacity.246  Too often, on-demand platforms are used for 
commercial services without in any way leveraging idle capacity—and 
without the protection of the rules that control incumbent markets.247  The 
on-demand firms turn a blind eye to these usages and frequently even feed 
them.248  The consequences of this phenomenon of the on-demand market 
on our lives are becoming clear:  it impacts fundamental employment 
structures, threatens the fabric of neighborhoods, and further restricts 
housing availability.249  The boosters of this non-gig economy attempt to 
hide this aspect of the market, but it is sizeable and noticeable:  companies 
now advise people where they should buy units for short-term investment, 
and more workers provide services without having basic employee 
protections.  If the on-demand firms wanted to curtail commercial use of 
their goods and services, they could easily do so.  However, these 
commercial transactions are vastly profitable to them; therefore, more often 
than not, despite their contrary rhetoric, they encourage such transactions.  
For consumers, it is easy to ignore the problems of the commercial side of 
the on-demand economy, since they see the more convenient and less 
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expensive services that that economy has helped to create.  But this head-
in-the-sand attitude comes with a price to others:  one’s cheaper vacation or 
more-available ride is another’s difficulty in finding housing or stable 
employment. 
Obviously, not all is bad in the on-demand economy.  The opposite, in 
fact, is true:  in its essence, the narrative that the on-demand firms sell us is 
real.  It does offer exciting new economic and social opportunities for those 
who use these platforms to maximize their underutilized resources.  A 
policy that distinguishes between the two types of activities discussed here 
would allow our society to get the most benefit out of this model while 
restraining the harms that can be—and are being—inflicted.250 
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